Bayesian theory proposes that confidence is a function of the probability that a decision is correct given the evidence. Empirical research has shown, however, that humans tend to report confidence in very different ways. This idiosyncratic behaviour suggests that different individuals may perform different computations to estimate confidence from uncertain evidence. We tested this hypothesis by collecting confidence reports from healthy adults making decisions under either visual or numerical uncertainty. We found that for most individuals, confidence did indeed reflect the perceived probability of being correct. However, in approximately half of them, confidence also reflected a different probabilistic quantity: the observed Fisher information. We isolated the influence of each of these two quantities on confidence, and found that this decomposition is stable across weeks, and consistent across tasks involving uncertainty in both perceptual and cognitive domains. Our findings provide, for the first time, a mechanistic interpretation of individual differences in the human sense of confidence.
Introduction
Understanding the computational basis of individual differences in human cognition has fundamental implications for medical and biological sciences as well as for economics and social sciences. A prime example is confidence, which plays a key role in a wide range of aspects in life, including learning to make better decisions 1 , monitoring our actions 2 , cooperating effectively with others 3, 4 , and displaying good political judgment 5 . One of the most intriguing features of confidence is that humans tend to communicate this feeling in a largely idiosyncratic way: although confidence reports are typically stable within each person, they tend to be variable across the population 6, 7 . For instance, different individuals performing the same task generate distributions of confidence ratings with different mean and shape 7 . In addition, the correlation between confidence and objective performance varies for different people, and is related to individual variations in brain structure 8 and connectivity 9, 10 . While a vast literature has focused on the biological correlates of individual differences in human confidence [8] [9] [10] , the computational roots of this phenomenon remain unclear.
Previous research in sensory psychophysics 8, 11 and value-based decision making 10 , assumed that confidence is a function solely of the perceived probability of being correct. This assumption is reasonable: confidence should only reflect this subjective probability [12] [13] [14] .
However, based on this normative framework, previous studies explained differences between people as measurement noise 15 , or as individual differences in the ability to reflect the probability of being correct 8, 9 . This may have been an oversimplification: there is extensive literature showing that confidence can be influenced by factors other than the probability of being correct 16 , such as the reliability of sensory stimuli 2, 13 , the magnitude of sensory data 11 , post-decisional biases 17 , and even personality traits 7 .
Here we set out to determine what probabilistic quantities, besides perceived probability of being correct, contribute to individual differences in human confidence. We focused on a categorical task, in which subjects had to decide whether the average of a set of items was above or below a decision boundary, and then report their confidence. For about half of the subjects, confidence did depend solely on the perceived probability that they were correct. However, for the other half, confidence also depended on a different statistical quantity: the inverse variance, which we refer to as the observed Fisher information 18, 19 (to avoid ambiguity associated with other terms used previously such as "certainty" 14 or "precision" 1 ). Moreover, the dependence of confidence on the perceived probability of being correct and the Fisher information was stable across experiments performed weeks apart.
Finally, we show that the dependence of confidence on the perceived probability of being correct was stable across tasks involving uncertainty in the perceptual and cognitive domain, but the dependence on Fisher information was not. This is consistent with the predictions of a recent theoretical account arguing that Fisher information is encoded by domain-specific neural populations 14 . Overall, these findings provide a mechanistic interpretation of individual differences in the human sense of confidence.
Results
In the perceptual task (Experiment 1), participants observed a sequence of 30 tilted Gabor patches presented at the fovea in rapid (4 Hz) serial visual presentation ( Fig.1a ). At the end of the sequence, participants decided whether the mean orientation of the patches was clockwise or counter-clockwise relative to vertical. Participants then reported how confident they were in their decision on a scale from 1 to 6. To manipulate uncertainty, we pseudorandomly drew the orientation samples from uniform distributions with exactly the same mean (+3 degrees or -3 degrees) but different variances on different trials ( Fig. 1b) . Participants performed better as variance decreased (Fig. 1c , one-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(3,29)=231.4, p<10 -10 ).
To fit the choices of each participant, we assumed that they keep track of the mean orientation, which they update after each stimulus presentation. To update their estimate of [1] the mean, we considered a model in which participants combine a noisy estimate of the current sample with their previous estimate of the mean, 30 is negative.
We also tested an alternative model that tracks the mean of the sequence in a deterministic way, and then makes stochastic decisions. This model, however, failed to explain the trend in Fig. 1c , which shows that performance increases as variance decreases (see [2]
Computation of confidence
To compute confidence, participants need to have an estimate of the variance of 30 . We assumed that they are able to compute the true variance associated with Equation [1] . Thus, perceived variance, denoted 30 2 , is given by
The model described by Equations [1] and [2] , which we call the stochastic updating model, is illustrated in the left two panels of Fig. 2a . Given 30 and 30 2 , subjects can compute, on each trial, the perceived probability of being correct, (correct) (shaded area under the Gaussian distribution in Fig. 2a ). Participants can also compute the Fisher information using 30 2 (top right panel in Fig. 2a ).
Using this model, we estimated the expected values of (correct) and Fisher information for different variance conditions, separated by correct and incorrect trials (see Online Methods, Equation [9] , and Fig. 2b,c) . On correct trials, both quantities increase with decreasing variance (solid grey lines in Figs. 2b and 2c) , as does confidence ( Fig. 1d ). If we had access only to correct trials, we would not know whether confidence was influenced by perceived probability of being correct or Fisher information. However, on error trials, these two quantities show opposite trends: (correct) decreases with decreasing variance while Fisher information increases (dashed black lines in Figs. 2b and 2c) . Confidence in errors, on the other hand, was relatively independent of variance (F(3,29)=0.57, p=0.63). One explanation of this phenomenon is that participants base confidence on both their perceived probability of being correct and, as a heuristic, the observed Fisher information. If confidence were an increasing function of both (correct) and Fisher information, and subjects weighted them approximately equally, confidence could be a relatively flat function of variance on incorrect trials (Fig. 1d) , and at the same time could increase with decreasing variance on correct trials. The analysis presented so far is based on population-averaged data ( Fig. 1d) , so it is uninformative about differences among individuals. To determine whether, and how,
(correct) and Fisher information influence confidence within subjects, we looked at the data of each individual. As expected 6, 7 , we observed substantial inter-individual differences ( Fig.   3 ). Some subjects did indeed base confidence solely on (correct). However, in approximately half of them, confidence appeared to be influencedat least to some degreeby Fisher information. To quantify this, we regressed 23 confidence reports against model-based estimates of (correct) and information. Fig. 3 shows a scatter plot of the regression weights for (correct) and Fisher information. In 13 out of the 30 participants, confidence significantly reflected (correct) but not information. In 14 other participants, however, confidence significantly reflected both (correct) and information. One participant's confidence conveyed only information but not (correct), and finally, for two participants, confidence did not reflect either of the two quantities. 
Stability across time
The regression model identified seven parameters for each individual (see Online Methods, Equation [10] ): a weight for (correct), denoted ; a weight for information, denoted ; and five parameters ( = 1, … ,5). The latter are the average log odds of observing a confidence rating greater than ; from these we selected the mid-value, 3 , which is based on splitting the confidence scale in halves. The parameter 3 was correlated with the average confidence across the entire experiment (r=0.84, p<10 -8 ), and so indicates how under-or overconfident a given participant is; we thus refer to 3 as the average confidence. We confirmed that individual differences in these parameters ( , , and 3 ) are not simply explained by how well our model fit decisions (see Online Methods). The regression weights, and , were correlated with measures of confidence used in previous studies: was correlated with how well confidence predicted accuracy, and was correlated with the subjects' ability to discriminate different variances (see Online Methods). The three selected variables were uncorrelated with each other across the population (r<0.35, p>0.1 for all pairwise comparisons between , , and 3 ).
This analysis would be no more than a model-fitting exercise if a different profilethat is, a different relationship between confidence, (correct), and Fisher informationemerged when the same participants were retested. To test for stability, in Experiment 2 we retested 14 of the participants from Experiment 1 approximately one month later. We observed that the three variables ( , , 3 ) were correlated across experiments ( Fig. 4) , indicating that this decomposition is stable across time and informative of the identity of the participants. To further validate this observation, we found that the distance in the 3-dimensional space defined by ( , , 3 ) within participants (across the two experiments) was smaller than the distance between different participants within an experiment (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z=4.0, p<10 -4 ). 
Consistency across tasks
To determine whether subjects compute confidence the same way across tasksthat is, whether they give the same weight to (correct) and Fisher information, and have the same average confidencewe repeated our experiments on a cognitive task: averaging a sequence of numbers. In Experiment 3, a new group of 20 participants performed, in counterbalanced order, the visual task described above and a numerical averaging task ( Fig. 5 ). In the numerical task, we presented two-digit numbers, updated at the same rate as in Experiment 1 (4 Hz). The task was to decide whether the mean of the sequence was greater or smaller than 50. Uncertainty was manipulated in the same way as in Experiment 1, but using different ranges to ensure comparable performance across tasks (see Online Methods for details).
In both tasks, accuracy increased with decreasing variance (Fig. 5a,b) . A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with factors "variance" and "task" showed a significant main effect Fig. 5c,d We asked if our three regressors were consistent across the numerical and visual tasks. The within-participants distance in the 3-dimensional space was smaller than the between-participants distance (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z=3.3, p<0.001). The contribution of (correct), (r=0.74, p<0.001) and trait confidence 3 (r=0.63, p<0.01) were significantly correlated across tasks. However, the weights of information, , were uncorrelated across tasks (r=0.20, p=0. 37) , indicating that Fisher information has quantitatively different effects on confidence in visual and numerical tasks (Fig. 6) . This result is in agreement with a recent theoretical account arguing that the inverse variance is represented by domain-specific neural populations 14 (see Discussion). 
Discussion
The computations underlying confidence have attracted considerable attention over the last several years, in part due to recent developments in model-based approaches 12-14 combined with neurophysiological recordings in non-human animals [24] [25] [26] and neuroimaging in humans [8] [9] [10] 27 . The standard approach consists of fitting a model to the entire population and treating inter-individual variability as noise 11, 15 . However, if such individual differences are robust over time, and consistent across tasks 7 , then treating them as noise limits our understanding of the computational processes underlying confidence. Here we found that inter-individual differences in confidence ratings are meaningful in terms of their underlying computations. In particular, we found that different individuals used different weightings for two probabilistic quantities: their perceived probability of being correct, and their certainty in their estimate of the task-relevant variable 14 , the latter quantified by the observed Fisher information 18, 19 . We isolated the contribution of each of these two quantities to confidence, and measured, for each individual: 1) the influence of the perceived probability of being correct on confidence ( ), 2)
the influence of Fisher information on confidence ( ), and 3) the participants' average confidence ( 3 ). All three variables were stable across several weeks (Fig. 4) , and two of them ( and 3 ) were stable across different tasksone in the perceptual domain; the other in the cognitive domain ( Fig. 6) .
Previous research has shown reliable individual differences in the mean and shape of the distribution of confidence ratings 6, 7 , and in the extent to which confidence predicts behavioural accuracy 7, 8 . These properties are believed to be idiosyncratic and correlate with individual variations in personality trait 7 , brain structure 8 , and resting-state functional connectivity 9 . For example, individual differences in the correlation between confidence and accuracy were systematically linked to a frontal network including the anterior prefrontal cortex, ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, and rostro-lateral prefrontal cortex 8, 10, 28, 29 . These findings were based on decisions in a wide range of contexts, including visual 8 and value-based 10 choices. Although these studies provided interesting insights about the brain regions that correlate with individual differences in confidence, none of them explicitly asked what probabilistic quantities influence this variability. In parallel, theoretical accounts have formalised a definition of confidence as the perceived probability of being correct [12] [13] [14] [15] , but without looking at individual differences. Here, we provide the first empirical evidence that the idiosyncratic nature of confidence is due to differences in the computation of confidence; more specifically, different individuals place different weighting on the perceived probability of being correct and the observed Fisher information.
In categorical tasks like ours, confidence should depend solely on the probability of being correct. So why does Fisher information affect confidence? We speculate that Fisher information, which is a useful measure of uncertainty in continuous quantities 1, 2, 13 , could serve as a mental shortcut that provides a proxy for the probability of being correct. This shortcut is reasonable, as Fisher information correlates with performance accuracy in our experiments ( Figs. 1c and 2c) . Previous research in our group showed that interacting dyads do take shortcuts: they communicate a confidence signal that is close to, yet different from, the probability of being correct 3 . Similarly, we previously found that confidence can reflect the magnitude of sensory data 11 , a choice-independent quantity that also correlates with behavioural performance. Our finding that a heuristic, such as Fisher information, modulates confidence judgements about categorical decisions is in line with these studies.
Predictions for neural data
Because the probability of being correct is a dimensionless quantity, and is universal across different sources of uncertainty, it could be encoded by a domain-general circuitryfor instance, by neurons in the prefrontal cortex 8, 10, 28, 29 . In contrast, Fisher information is a quantity with dimension, and so is presumably encoded by domain-specific populations 14 . For example, in the case of the visual task, certainty could be represented by neurons in primary visual cortex that are tuned to orientation 30 ; and indeed, sensory uncertainty can be decoded from activity in the visual cortex 31 . In the same manner, numerical certainty could be represented by neurons in the parietal cortex tuned to different numerical quantities 32 , although this has not yet been tested.
An implication of our findings is that neurons representing confidence should receive input both from populations encoding the perceived probability of being correct and from populations encoding Fisher information. Consequently, because of differences in functional connectivity (which are likely to arise during learning and development) different individuals should have different weightings for the perceived probability of being correct and Fisher information on confidence. This is exactly what we saw in Fig. 3 . In addition, because the perceived probability of being correct is encoded by domain-independent populations and Fisher information by domain-specific ones, the influence of perceived probability of being correct on confidence should be stable across domains, while the influence of Fisher information should be domain specific. This is exactly what we saw n in Figs. 6a and 6b, respectively. Based on these observations, we can make a strong prediction, one that could be tested with neuroimaging studies: the larger the influence of Fisher information on confidence, the stronger the correlation between activity in domain-specific areas and confidence.
Conclusion
The value of investigating individual differences in human behaviour and cognition was first recognised in the psychological sciences, with a special interest in high-level aspects such as intelligence 33 and personality 34 . More recently, technical advances in magnetic resonance imaging have made it possible to develop a cognitive neuroscience of individual differences 35, 36 . Findings include neural correlates of individual differences in motor behaviour 37 , visual perception 38 , mood 39 , social network size 40 , and confidence [8] [9] [10] . While these studies provide valuable insights into the neural basis of inter-individual differences in human cognition, the mechanisms responsible for such differences remain unknown. To overcome this limitation, the next challenge is to build a computational neuroscience of individual differences. A first step in this direction is to understand the computations performed by healthy adults leading to inter-individual variability in behaviour. Our study represents the first effort to model differences in human confidence, paving the way towards finding how these computations change under development 41 , aging 42 , and psychiatric disorders 43 . The orientations of the patches were drawn from uniform distributions with mean m and endpoints m±v. We used distributions with two different means (m = +3 or -3 degrees) and four different variances (given by their different endpoints: v = 10, 14, 24, or 45 degrees).
Online Methods
Uniform distributions were pseudo-randomly sampled such that the mean was exactly ±3 degrees on every trial. Orientations were randomly shuffled to define the presentation order.
The experiment consisted of 400 trials: 50 trials for each of the eight distributions. Blocked feedback was given every 20 trials by a message displaying the number of correct trials in that block. Each block comprised 5 trials of each variance condition presented in random order.
Therefore, performance for different variance conditions could not be learned from feedback.
Experiment 2: Stability across time
All participants of Experiment 1 were invited to perform the visual task a second time, approximately one month later. 14 participants accepted the invitation and were re-tested.
Experiment 2 was performed 35.2±2.4 days after Experiment 1 (range: 23-49 days).
Experimenters were blind to the results of Experiment 1 when testing participants in Experiment 2.
Experiment 3: Stability across the perceptual and cognitive domain
20 healthy adults who did not participate in Experiment 1 or 2 performed Experiment 3.
Participants performed two sessions: the visual task described in Experiment 1 and a numerical averaging task. Half of the participants performed the visual task first. The second session was performed 9.7±2.9 days (range: 1-27 days) after the first one. Experimenters were blind to the results of the first session when testing the participants in the second session.
The numerical task was identical in structure to the visual task but, instead of Gabor patches, two-digit numbers (size: 3.8 deg; font: Arial) were presented. The colour of the numbers (black or white over a middle grey background) was randomly chosen at each presentation. Participants were instructed to decide whether the mean of the sequence was greater or smaller than 50. Numbers were sampled from uniform distributions with mean m = 47 or m = 53, and endpoints m±v were defined by v = 8, 11, 16 or 22. These values were chosen, through pilot experiments with a different set of participants, to obtain performances similar to that observed in Experiment 1. Uniform distributions were pseudo-randomly sampled such that the mean of the sequence was exactly m on each trial. Decisions were collected in the same way as in Experiment 1: a response screen with two options ("smaller" and "greater") was presented on both sides of the visual field. Participants gave their answer, and indicated confidence, using the same keys as in the visual task.
Model fitting
To fit the stochastic updating model (Equations [1] and [2] ) to the participants' decisions, we find, for each individual, the parameters and that maximise the log likelihood, is the mean value of 30 on trial . (A minor technical point: Equation [4] describes the visual task; the cognitive task is the same except that the mean is offset by 50.)
Estimating the Fisher information and the perceived probability of being correct
Based on the best fitting parameters and derived from the stochastic updating model, we estimated, on a trial-by-trial basis, the observed Fisher information and the expected perceived probability of being correct. The observed Fisher information is just the inverse variance of the participants' estimate, the latter computed via Equation [2] (Fig. 2a) ) .
The second term in the integral, ( 30 | ̅ 30 , 30 , ), is the probability of observing 30 given ̅ 30 , 30 , and, importantly, the decision, . If the decision is clockwise ( = +1), 30 must be positive, whereas if the decision is counterclockwise ( = −1), 30 On each trial, (correct| ̅ 30 , 30 , ) was computed numerically using Matlab. Note that the expected perceived probability of being correct (Equation [9] ) is dependent on the decision, , whereas the Fisher information (Equation [2] , Fig.2a ) is choice-independent.
Ordinal regression of confidence reports
We ran for each individual a multivariate ordinal regression 23 
Does model fitting explain our findings?
[10] [9] We asked if individual differences in how well our model fitted decisions could explain interindividual variability in the parameters , , and 3 . To do this, we correlated these values with the observed maximum log-likelihood,
where log is obtained using Equation [3] . We observed that ℒ was not significantly correlated with (r=0. 27, p=0.15) 
Comparison with other measures of confidence
We measured the ability to discriminate correct from incorrect trials (also known as "metacognitive ability") using an approach inspired by signal detection theory: we computed the type-2 area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC2) 44 . Given a set of confidence ratings from 1 to 6, there are 5 possible "criterions" to classify trials as having "low" or "high" confidence. The AUROC2 is constructed by measuring the area under the curve defined by the hit rate (i.e., the proportion of correct trials that were reported with high [11] [12]
confidence) versus the false alarm rate (i.e., the proportion of incorrect trials that were reported with high confidence). correlated with the AUROC2 (r=0.53, p<0.01).
We also estimated the participants' ability to discriminate different conditions. To this end, we obtained the distributions of ratings at each variance condition, and computed their Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence 11 . The JS divergence between two distributions and is JS ( , ) = 0.5 KL ( |
where KL ( | ) is the Kullback-Leibler 45 divergence between and ,
For each participant, we computed the distribution of confidence ratings at each of the four variance levels, and averaged the Jensen-Shannon divergences across all pairs. was correlated with this quantity (r=0.86, p<10 -8 ).
Statistical analyses
In Experiment 1, we computed the average performance for each variance condition and each participant. These values were submitted to a one-way repeated measures analysis of variance (rm-ANOVA) with factor "variance condition" (4 levels) and "participant" (30 levels)
as repeated measure (Fig. 1) . The normality assumption of this test was checked using the Lilliefors test (k=0.7, c=0.8, p=0.07). We also computed the average confidence rating for each variance condition and each participant, conditioned on correct or incorrect trials, and submitted those values to a two-way rm-ANOVA with factors "variance condition" (4 levels), "outcome" (2 levels: correct or incorrect), and "participant" (30 levels) as repeated measure (Fig. 2c) . The normality assumption of this test was checked using the Lilliefors test (k=0.04, c=0.06, p>0.5). The goodness of the fit for each model and subject (Supplementary Fig. 1b) , quantified by the negative log-likelihood (Equation [3] ), was submitted to a two-sided paired ttest (29 degrees of freedom). The normality assumption of this test was checked using the Lilliefors test (k=0.08, c=0.11, p>0.5).
[13]
[14]
In Experiment 2, we compared the within-participants distances in the space defined by ( , , 3 ) with the between-subjects distances. Because we have 14 participants, this defines 14 within-subjects distances and 14×13/2=91 between-subjects distances. We zscored each dimension and used the Euclidean metric to compute distance. The Lilliefors test rejected the null hypothesis that these values were normal (k=0.1, c=0.08, p=0.01); therefore, we used a non-parametric test, the Wilcoxon ranked sum test. This test is unpaired and the reported p-value is two-sided.
In Experiment 3, we computed the average performance for each variance condition, task, and participant ( Fig. 5a,b) . We submitted these values to a two-way rm-ANOVA with factors "variance condition" (4 levels), "task" (2 levels), and "participants" (20 levels) as repeated measure. The normality assumption of this test was checked using the Lilliefors test (k=0.07, c=0.09, p=0.36). We computed the average confidence rating across all conditions and participants and performed the same rm-ANOVA used in Experiment 1 (Fig. 5c,d) . As in Experiment 1, average confidence was normally distributed (Lilliefors test, k=0.06, c=0.07, p=0.17). To evaluate the stability of ( , , 3 ) across domains, we computed the within-and between-subjects distances following the same procedure of Experiment 2, and compared these values using the same non-parametric test.
Data and code availability
The data and codes that support our findings are available upon request to the corresponding author. [S1]
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] Supplementary Figure 1 . Model fitting results. We fit two probabilistic models that make different assumptions about how decisions are made. The stochastic updating (SU) model is described in the main text (Equations [1] and [2] ). In the stochastic decisions (SD) model, the agent makes deterministic updates, the same 20 participants of Experiment 3 performing the numerical averaging task.
